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1 One of the biggest challenges faced by minority language movements across Europe is the
association that most people inherently make between a language and a people,  or a
nation. After all, if most people who speak Slovene are Slovene, and most people who are
Slovene speak Slovene,  then why would the same correlation not apply to any other
language? As a result,  almost  inevitably and often unintentionally,  minority language
development becomes associated with movements of national determination, of whatever
kind – summed up perhaps by the old Welsh maxim Cenedl heb iaith, cenedl heb galon (“a
nation  without  a  language  is  a  nation  without  a  heart”).  The  difficulty  is  that  the
correlation  is  almost  universally  inaccurate.  This  paper  argues  that  the  correlation
between “language” and “nation” is often unhelpful to minority language development,
particularly with reference to Ulster Scots (defined as the variety of the Scots tongue
spoken in parts of Northern Ireland and County Donegal), and that indeed the “language
versus dialect” debate this correlation inevitably engenders is pointless and unhelpful.
2 How is  the correlation between “language” and “nation” inaccurate? Most obviously,
most people who speak English (however defined) are not English; indeed, counting those
who speak it fluently as a second language, England itself is a comparatively minor part of
the  modern English-speaking  world.  Furthermore,  the recent  census  of  England and
Wales demonstrated clearly that an increasing minority of English and Welsh residents
(8%) do not in fact speak English at home (or at all)1. The correlation therefore falls down
immediately in the case of the world's most widely spoken language.
3 Even within the boundaries of Europe, where the “nation state” (which is often defined or
was defined by linguistic boundaries) took root, the correlation is of scant value. Most
French  people  do  indeed  speak  French  –  but  so  do  lots  of  Belgians  and  Swiss.
Proportionately as many Austrians speak German as Germans; yet Austria was itself once
the  centre  of  a  multi-national  and  multi-lingual  empire  which,  even  after  the
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“independence” of many of its nation states, has left linguistic minorities all over the
place. A third of Hungarian speakers in Europe do not live in Hungary – many live in
Romania; yet many Romanian speakers live in Moldova. Polish is indeed the dominant
language in Poland, but is also now the second language of the UK and Ireland – the
17,700  Northern Ireland residents  declaring  it  as  their  “main  language”  at  the  2011
census outnumber those for Irish by four to one.  Some Italians speak German;  some
Czechs  speak  Slovak;  some  Estonians  speak  Russian.  This  is  before  we  get  into  the
“language  definition”  debate  –  some  Spaniards  speak  Galician  (perhaps  closer  to
Portuguese  than  Spanish);  some  Swiss  speak  “Swiss  German”;  most  Luxembourgers
switch between Germanic Luxembourgish and Standard French depending on context.
Even though international frontiers came sometimes even to mark linguistic frontiers
(e.g.  between German and Dutch),  even a Europe of over 50 sovereign units does not
match “nation” with “language” in any meaningful way.
4 If the correlation between “nation” and “language” does not stand up to scrutiny in the
case of widely known national and administrative languages, why then do we insist on
assuming the two are linked when it comes to minority languages? It is widely assumed
that anyone who takes an interest in the development of, for example, Catalan or Scots is
likely to be a Catalan or Scottish Nationalist; indeed, most people would assume the two
are directly interlinked, with the language used (or abused, according to preference) to
emphasise the distinct “national identity” of the would-be independent state. It is not for
me to determine whether or not this helps the political objective being assumed; but I am
certain it hinders the linguistic one.
5 The fact,  with both the above examples,  is  that Catalan and Scots are widely spoken
languages  in  certain  spheres  of  life  (exactly  which spheres  differ,  with  Catalan  now
enjoying much wider access to more formal, educational and administrative settings than
Scots does). The fact is also that their speakers are almost all proficient in the dominant
administrative language of the state (Spanish in the case of Catalonia/Spain and English
in the case of Scotland/UK), and that this “dominant” language also has a wider global
role, and thus international economic and diplomatic importance, as one of the most
widely spoken languages on the planet. Therefore, to tie the minority language in with an
independence movement is to suggest the minority language could one day enjoy the
same status as the currently “dominant” language – even though Spanish and English
have obviously global reach and Catalan and Scots obviously never will. However, this is
plainly  a  ludicrous  suggestion.  The  current  national  governments  of  Catalonia  and
Scotland may aspire to independence on a par with the rest of Spain or the UK, and they
have every right to that aspiration, but most of their residents – even those pre-disposed
to support the objective of independence – would recognise that suggesting minority
languages could or even should ever enjoy parity in a globalised world with languages
such as Spanish or English is quite ridiculous (and conceivably even economically harmful
if they are taught in preference to the core science and technology subjects which many
people  feel  will  drive  the  21st century  economy).  The  result  is  that  tying  minority
languages  to  independence  movements  suggests  an  unattainable  objective  for  those
minority languages – leading a lot of people, even those instinctively supportive of the
independence movements, to give up on them altogether.
6 Across the “Sheuch”2 from Scotland lies Northern Ireland, which naturally has its own
constitutional peculiarities. Here, the “Irish” language had already become intertwined in
the familiar way with Irish Nationalism, itself assumed to correlate with Irish Catholicism
Language and Politics in Ireland – a Constructive or Destructive Inte...
Études irlandaises, 38-2 | 2013
2
too. Thus, Scots (known in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland as “Ulster
Scots”,  in the same way Dutch in Belgium is  often referred to as “Flemish”)  became
intertwined with Unionism. Given the tendency for minority languages to be associated
with breakaway national movements, it in fact became more obviously associated with
“Loyalism”, a form of Unionism which vehemently opposes any hint of unity with the rest
of  Ireland and yet regards its  affiliation to Britain as strictly conditional,  to such an
extent  indeed  that  minority  strands  of  “Loyalism”  have  even  hinted  at  a  last-ditch
preference for a separate Protestant State in the north east of Ireland, as was evidenced
notably through the “Ulster Clubs” movement in the 1990s, for example. However, the
link between the Scots tongue as spoken in Ireland (Ulster Scots) and “Loyalism” bears no
relation  to  reality  whatsoever.  This  is  immediately  obvious  from  the  fact  that
contemporary Ulster Scots is spoken exclusively in rural areas and “Loyalism” is more
evident in the urban inner-city.
7 Government  departments  and  agencies  in  Northern  Ireland  have,  unfortunately,
subscribed to the fiction that  “Ulster  Scots” and “Loyalism” are somehow linked.  As
recently in 2012, a Department of Culture consultation running from July to November
2012 referred throughout, including in its title, to “Ulster-Scots language, heritage and
culture”,  in  such a  way as  to  suggest  in  effect  that  the  Scots  language and Loyalist
heritage and culture were to be regarded as a single unit, when in reality they are almost
entirely distinct, even geographically. As a result, the language has come to be almost
totally ignored; since it is tied to a group of people who do not speak it, any attempts at
promoting it inviting ridicule, with the result that most people in Northern Ireland refuse
to believe that there are any speakers. Ulster Scots speakers themselves, meanwhile, are
left marginalised from any attempts at “promotion”, because almost all such attempts are
aimed, for “culture and heritage” reasons, at a completely different set of people – people
who  actually  speak  English!  This  is  a  perfect  example  of  the  risk  of  trying  to  link
“language” to “nation” – sometimes the two scarcely coincide at all.
8 Another difficulty for Ulster Scots, given its implicit association with “Loyalism” and thus
with “Unionism” (and therefore against Nationalism), is that its proponents have often
been unwilling to share their development work with those developing Scots in Scotland,
precisely because the latter are assumed (often correctly)  to be in favour of  Scottish
independence and thus  of  a  completely  opposing view concerning the  constitutional
future of the UK. As a result, the tendency in Northern Ireland has been to argue for
language status for “Ulster Scots” alone, suggesting it is distinct not just from “English”
but also from “Scots”. Politically this is bizarre and linguistically it lacks any justification
whatsoever. Politically, it amounts to supposed Unionists (i.e. people assumed to support
linkage  between  Northern  Ireland  and  Great  Britain)  opposing an  obvious  link  to
Scotland; linguistically,  there simply is no case for suggesting Ulster Scots in distinct
grammatically,  lexically  or  phonologically  from  Scottish  Scots,  and  indeed  its
development  in  harmed  by  doing  so.  Denying  –  for  political  reasons  –  the  obvious
linguistic links between Ulster Scots and Scottish Scots deprives Ulster Scots of much of
its interest; why would proponents of any variety of Scots wish to cut themselves off
linguistically from the writings of Burns (including “Auld Lang Syne” and “Burns Nights”)
or the vocabulary of the game of golf (putt, links, divot, etc.), when these are the key
introductory points of immediate and obvious interest to millions of people even well
beyond the British Isles?
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9 The other fundamental difficulty with the false intertwining of “nation” and “language”
in the case of minority languages is that too many proponents of minority languages are
inclined to take an attack on one as an attack on the other, and define them in similar
terms. For example, a suggestion that Scots is not a “language” in the true sense is not, in
fact,  an  attack  on  the  idea  that  the  Scottish  nation  could  do  perfectly  well  as  an
independent country; it is merely a suggestion that the Scots language is not used across
the whole range of  settings from formal  to informal.  People who are inclined to tie
together minority language development with campaigns for political independence are
inclined to spend a lot of time arguing over language status in the same way they argue
over national status, despite the fact that the two are entirely separate arguments! Scots
could quite easily be revived with Scotland remaining in the UK. After all,  Welsh has
flourished within the UK far more than Irish has in the independent Republic of Ireland;
on the other hand, an independent Scotland could quite easily decide to promote English
for economic reasons to the exclusion of Scots.
10 This point transfers to Northern Ireland too. The suggestion that Ulster Scots is not a
language,  or  at  least  lacks the range that  English has,  is  often taken as  an insult  to
Loyalist or broader Unionist culture because that culture is supposedly intertwined with
the  Ulster  Scots  language.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  public  figures  who  react  most
vehemently to this suggestion are, without exception, unwilling to utter so much as a
word in Ulster Scots – because, as established above, they actually speak English! Visiting
actual  speakers  of  Ulster  Scots,  on  the  other  hand,  one  is  instantly  struck  how
unconcerned they are about the “language versus dialect” debate (in much the same way
speakers of Swiss German are unconcerned about it). The most prominent living poet in
Ulster Scots, Jim Fenton, has long studiously avoided the debate altogether by referring
to it as a “tongue” – precisely because he wants people to enjoy it, not argue about it!
11 Why is this? Here, I  proceed with caution because when assessing a group of people,
however defined, it is easy to drift into generalisation and conjecture. Nevertheless, much
of this still derives, in my view, from the “Siege Mentality” of many Ulster Protestants, a
mentality which is felt very much to be literal.
12 The story of “The Siege”, which in Northern Ireland needs no further definition to be
taken automatically to mean the 1689 Siege of Derry, is highly relevant here. The albeit
slightly simplified narrative carried down to the present day involves not just the clash
between  the  Catholic  “Irish”  Jacobites  seeking  to  take  the  city  and  the  mainly
Presbyterian “Ulster Scots” city residents who held out against all  odds,  but also the
“English” – namely the English ships which waited in Lough Swilly for months instead of
intervening, and (in common Ulster Protestant perception at least) leaving those inside
the city walls  to starve.  This presentation of  the “English” as essentially gutless and
untrustworthy remains characteristic of much Ulster Protestant mentality and instinct to
this day. Ironically this further enforces the “siege mentality” of the community as they
see  themselves  caught  between  an  adversary  on  one  side  (the  “Irish”)  and  fellow
countrymen they don't trust on the other (the “English”).
13 It is this which, long pre-dating any “language” movement, gives the notion of “Ulster
Scots” – even if it was not always so widely referred to as such – a particular resonance
for many Ulster Protestants, particularly those for whom “identity” is most important.
The world over, those who are most preoccupied with identity generally tend to be those
of more limited means, i.e., these days, those in the inner cities and some rural locations.
Exactly how this played out politically and linguistically has varied from time to time.
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Most “Ulster Scots” instinctively took the American side in 1776, many joined the 1798
rebellion, some (including nearly a third of Presbyterian Ministers in Ulster as noted in a
recent BBC documentary series on Irish Presbyterianism) were supportive of Home Rule
at least until the Ne Temere decree of 19073. Prior to the Victorian Age, Ulster Scots were
marked for the priority they gave to education and particularly literacy, but in creative
writing and particularly in poetry many purposefully followed Scots norms – including
not just vocabulary, spelling and grammar but even verse forms – rather than English
ones;  i.e. they preferred Burns to Wordsworth.  The County Down poet,  Hugh Porter,
writing at the start of the 19th century, perhaps summed it up best when he wrote of his
own use of language (and, perhaps, of his own identity):
[…] in the style appears,
The accent o’ my early years, 
Which is nor Scotch nor English either, 
But part o’ baith mix'd up thegither: 
But it’s the sort my neighbours use, 
Wha think shoon prettier far than shoes4.
14 Perhaps his more famous contemporary, James Orr from Ballycarry in County Antrim,
went further and dismissed the English entirely, most notably in “Ode to the Potatoe5”
where he mocks the “English” for requiring so many crops when the “Irish” (to which he
is clear he belongs, if only by virtue of his birth and upbringing on the island of Ireland)
make do perfectly well with one – a poem made, in retrospect, almost into a tragedy by
the Great Famine little more than a generation later.
15 In other words, politically and linguistically, the notion of “Ulster Scots” has long been
compelling for Ulster Protestants, as has the link between the politics and linguistics of
“Ulster Scots”, based as they are upon Ulster Protestants’ sense of being trapped (indeed,
besieged) between the English and the Irish; however, how precisely this has revealed
itself has swung dramatically over time. Those who define themselves as “Ulster Scots”
have always been split fully three ways, Nationalist, Liberal and Unionist, but exactly in
which proportion has varied hugely from generation to generation, and may do so again.
16 So it is that we arrive at a contemporary situation in which most (though not all) who
associate themselves with “Ulster Scots” regard themselves as “Unionist”, seeing the two
as intertwined, and yet often at the same time rejecting outright any direct linguistic
association between “Ulster Scots” and “Scots”; in other words, for many, Ulster Scots has
become  something  to  be  associated  exclusively  with  “Ulster”  and  not  shared  with
Scotland. It is a peculiar thing, surely, for “Unionists” who support the link with Great
Britain politically to deny it linguistically?
17 Yet the combination of the two core parts of this paper explains this peculiarity, at least
in part.  Firstly,  because everything in Northern Ireland is mirrored into two sides:  if
“Nationalists”  have  their  own  exclusive  culture  (incorporating  a  language),  so  must
“Unionists” have theirs. Secondly, as we have seen with regard to the Loyalists, most
“Unionists” belong to a heritage which, while supportive of the link with Great Britain, is
also  greatly  suspicious  of  the  people  who live  there.  These  combine  to  explain  why
“Unionists”, having in fact secured their constitutional future as best they possibly can
within the UK, remain so wary and suspicious. This lack of confidence cannot easily be
overcome.
18 It was noted earlier also that many Ulster Scots, at least historically, had in fact been
“Liberals” (now most likely to associate with the contemporary Alliance Party rather than
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any of the Unionist groupings). Historian Eamon Phoenix notes that, even in the run-up
to the Covenant of 1912 led by all the great Unionist Leaders of the time designed to
demonstrate  their  determination to remain fully  part  of  the United Kingdom,  entire
hamlets in Scots-speaking and predominantly Protestant parts of rural Ulster (such as
Armoy) refused to sign6. This provides evidence of the presence, even at that stage, of a
radical Liberal tradition running contrary to the perceived Conservatism of “Unionists”.
It  is  even conceivable that it  suggests that certain “Ulster Scots” did not necessarily
regard themselves as “British” in preference to “Irish”.
19 So what do modern “Liberals” make of this intertwining of language and culture? In
truth, they do not think much about it. Liberals across the world tend to focus more on
the reasoned and rational, and thus make political appeals to the “head”, where many
others focus more on the emotional  and indeed identity-based,  thus making political
appeals  to  the  “heart”.  The  recent  Flags  Dispute  over  Christmas  2012  was  a  classic
example: the Liberals took a rational position that the flag on Belfast City Hall should
change from flying 365 days a year as it always had in Belfast to flying on “designated
days” as was the case with most Councils in the rest of the UK, in a way which would
maintain the flying of the sovereign flag without overdoing its use in the centre of a city
of divided national affiliations. Unionists, particularly Loyalists, took the more emotional
position  that  “their  flag”  was  being  “taken  away”.  The  fact  that  once-militant  Irish
Republicans, for the first time in the history of Ireland, voted to fly the Union Flag over a
civic building was lost to all sides, even though in theory it was a thorough endorsement
of both the Liberal position (on the flag) and the Unionist position (on the constitution).
Liberals were unable to engage at the emotional, identity-based level in order to claim
victory; and for aforementioned reasons, Unionists are always too suspicious to engage
rationally to claim it.
20 Similarly, on language, Liberals tend to focus merely on the use of language as a mode of
direct communication, rather than on the intertwining of language and political identity
(and the way in which language can be used to communicate much more than just what is
conveyed by the words themselves). In the same way they dismiss emotional attachments
to  symbols,  they  dismiss  emotional  attachments  to  languages.  Although  in  theory
Alliance  Party  policy  in  recent  manifestos  is  supportive  of  the  development  of  all
minority languages, this support rejects any notion that “indigenous” languages such as
Irish  and Ulster  Scots  should  be  treated  any  differently  from more  recently  arrived
languages such as Cantonese and Polish, and in practice gives such primacy to English
that other languages would perhaps be best subtly forgotten. Indeed, Alliance election
leaflets have appeared with small sections in Polish, Chinese and Lithuanian but never in
Irish or Ulster Scots. This is, rationally, an entirely sensible policy position and party
strategy, of course. However, does it do justice to the emotional side, based as it is on
centuries of the intertwining of language, politics and identity?
 
Conclusion
21 The whole thing has, in my view, broader political implications for Northern Ireland.
Once one accepts that “language” and “nation” are not necessarily intertwined, and may
indeed not be connected at all, one can begin to imagine that the whole diametric view of
Northern Ireland to which we are supposed to subscribe may not be true at all. Under
nationality,  we are supposed to choose “Irish” or “British”;  under political  affiliation
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“Nationalist”  or  “Unionist”;  under  religious  background  “Catholic”  or  “Protestant”;
under language “Irish Gaelic” or  “Ulster  Scots”;  under sporting preference “GAA” or
“hockey/cricket”;  even  under  football  team  “Celtic”  or  “Rangers”.  However,  if  the
correlation between “language” and “nation” does not stand up to scrutiny, do any of
these other correlations?
22 Once we in Northern Ireland begin to accept that the idea that to be “German” you have
to speak “German” and to speak “German” you have to be “German” is a myth, suddenly a
whole lot of other myths become apparent – such as the one that we must neatly box
ourselves  into  compartments  marked  “Irish-Nationalist-Gaelic”  or  “British-Unionist-
Ulster Scots”. Once we recognise that in fact we may wish to exercise a free choice in
distinguishing between “language” on one hand and “nation” (or “culture and heritage”)
on the other, a very different, new Northern Ireland opens up – one which is not so much
bitterly divided as fascinatingly multi-faceted. Is a future embracing that new Northern
Ireland not much, much better than the one in which a bitter sectarian conflict has cost
thousands of lives?
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ABSTRACTS
This paper demonstrates that the idea that a language, a culture and a nation are tied together as
one single unit just because they share the same name is almost always fundamentally flawed. In
Northern Ireland, the tying together of “Irish language”, “Irish culture” and “Irish Nationalism”
has led to a mirrored response from opponents of Irish Nationalism, who have sought to present
“Ulster Scots language, heritage and culture” as a single entity. Because they are not a single
entity,  the outcome of this has been the presentation of “Ulster Scots” as something at best
unreal  and  at  worst  invented.  This  has  merely  meant  that  the  identity  crisis  that  some  in
Northern Ireland are experiencing has continued, while much needed work on promoting “Ulster
Scots language” and “Ulster Scots culture” as the distinct entities they are has gone undone.
Cet article démontre que l’idée qu’une langue, une culture et une nation puissent former une
seule  entité  simplement  parce  qu’elles  partagent  le  même  nom  est  presque  toujours
fondamentalement erronée. En Irlande du Nord la façon dont la « langue irlandaise », la « culture
irlandaise » et le « nationalisme irlandais » ont été reliés ensemble a produit un effet de miroir
parmi les  opposants  au nationalisme irlandais,  qui  ont tenté  de faire  croire  que « la  langue,
l’héritage et la culture Ulster Scots » constituent un seul et même bloc. Or, puisque ces éléments
ne constituent pas un seul bloc, le résultat de cette stratégie a été que l’« Ulster-Scots » paraît au
mieux, irréel, au pire, inventé. Ainsi, la crise identitaire que vivent certains en Irlande du Nord
n’a pas été résolue, et beaucoup de travail qui aurait dû être fait pour promouvoir la « langue
Ulster Scots » et la « culture Ulster Scots » n’a pas été effectué.
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